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Construction Law
by Ward Stone, Jr. *
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the Survey Period, the Georgia appellate courts handed down
a number of decisions underscoring the requirement that contractors
hold valid and current contractor’s licenses issued by the Secretary of
State’s office in order to be able to enforce construction contracts. 1
Several attempts to side-step the statute, 2 carve out exceptions, or avoid
the harsh consequences of violating the statute were rejected in favor of
strict interpretation. As several courts noted concerning the licensing
statutes:
[I]n construing any statutory text, we must presume that the General
Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we
must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must
view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must
read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an
ordinary speaker of the English language would. 3

During the Survey Period, Georgia courts also affirmed the eight-year
outside limit under the statute of repose for bringing contract or tort
claims arising out of a contract of construction, 4 examined the standards
* Senior Partner, Stone & Baxter, LLP, Macon, GA. University of Georgia (A.B., 1976);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1979). Member, Mercer Law Review (1977–1979).
Member, State Bar of Georgia (Former Chairman, Bankruptcy Section). Founding
Chairman, Middle District of Georgia Bankruptcy Law Institute, Inc. The author would
like to express appreciation to Andrew Wharton and Sarah C. Maley, each members of the
Mercer University School of Law, Class of 2021, for their assistance in compiling this
article.
1 For an analysis of construction law during the prior Survey Period, see Frank O.
Brown, Jr., Construction Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 57 (2019).
2 O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b) (2020).
3 Duke Builders, Inc. v. Massey, 351 Ga. App. 535, 536, 831 S.E.2d 172, 174 (2019)
(quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172–73, 751 S.E.2d 337, 342 (2013)).
4 See S. States Chem., Inc. v. Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc., 353 Ga. App. 286, 836 S.E.2d
617 (2019).

59

60

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

for awarding attorney's fees in Miller Act 5 fee-shifting cases, 6 examined
the effectiveness of lien waivers, 7 and examined the limitations on
indemnity provisions in construction contracts. 8
II.
A.

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO HAVE A CONTRACTOR’S LICENSE

Fleetwood v. Lucas

In Fleetwood v. Lucas, 9 the Georgia Court of Appeals again reaffirmed
the necessity of holding a contractor’s license as a prerequisite for
enforcing a construction contract. 10 Lucas, an unlicensed contractor, filed
suit against the Fleetwoods, et al., for the balance claimed to be due to
him under contracts for improvements to a house and an office,
respectively, owned by the Fleetwoods. The Fleetwoods moved for
summary judgment and then a directed verdict based upon Lucas’s
failure to have a Georgia contractor’s license as required under O.C.G.A.
§ 43-41-17(b). Lucas admittedly did not possess a Georgia general
contractor’s license when he entered into the contracts, nor did he inform
the Fleetwoods that he did not possess a license. 11 The court quoted
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b) which provides, in relevant part:
Any contract entered into . . . for the performance of work for which a
residential contractor or general contractor license is required by this
chapter and not otherwise exempted under this chapter and which is
between an owner and a contractor who does not have a valid and
current license required for such work in accordance with this chapter
shall be unenforceable in law or in equity by the unlicensed
contractor. 12

The court noted that O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(a) 13 provides that “no person,
whether an individual or a business organization, shall have the right to
engage in the business of residential contracting or general contracting
without a current, valid residential contractor license or general

Miller Act of 1935, 74 P.L. No. 321, 49 Stat. 793.
See United States ex rel. Cleveland Constr. v. Stellar Grp., Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12709*; 2019 WL 338887.
7 See ALA Constr. Servs., LLC v. Controlled Access, Inc., 351 Ga. App. 841, 833 S.E.2d
570 (2019).
8 See Milliken & Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 306 Ga. 6, 829 S.E.2d 111 (2019).
9 354 Ga. App. 320, 840 S.E.2d 720 (2020).
10 Id. at 325, 840 S.E.2d at 724.
11 Id. at 322, 840 S.E.2d at 721–22.
12 Id. at 323, 840 S.E.2d at 722 (alterations in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b)).
13 O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(a) (2020).
5
6
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contractor license[.]” 14 However, Lucas claimed that the work he
performed on the house did not require a license because it was “repair
work,” 15 relying upon O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(g), 16 which states:
Nothing in this chapter shall preclude a person from offering or
contracting to perform or undertaking or performing for an owner
repair work, provided that the person performing the repair work
discloses to the owner that such person does not hold a license under
this chapter and provided, further, that such work does not affect the
structural integrity of the real property. 17

The court noted that Rule 553-8-.01 of the Georgia Compilation of
Rules and Regulations 18 defines repair “to mean fixing, mending,
maintenance, replacement[,] or restoring of a part or portions of real
property to good condition.” 19 The court examined the scope of work for
the house and concluded that the services to be performed by Lucas
exceeded the definition for repairs under the Rule, but concluded that
nevertheless Lucas could not argue the exception applied because he
failed to disclose that he did not possess a contractor’s license, as required
by the statute. 20
For the office property, Lucas admitted that the scope of work
contracted for would have required a contractor’s license but insisted that
the Fleetwoods acted as the general contractor and he was merely the
servant of the Fleetwoods. 21 Therefore, Lucas argued, he was not a
“contractor” subject to the statute and no license was required. 22
The court examined the definition of a contractor under O.C.G.A.
§ 43-41-2(4), 23 which states:
“Contractor,” except as specifically exempted by this chapter, means a
person who is qualified, or required to be qualified, under this chapter
and who, for compensation, contracts to, offers to undertake or
undertakes to, submits a bid or a proposal to, or personally or by others
performs the construction or the management of the construction for

14 Fleetwood, 354 Ga. App. at 323, 840 S.E.2d at 722 (alteration in original) (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(a)).
15 Id. at 322, 840 S.E.2d at 722.
16 O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(g) (2020).
17 Fleetwood, 354 Ga. App. at 323, 840 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(g)).
18 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 553-8-.01 (2020).
19 Fleetwood, 354 Ga. App. at 324, 840 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
553-8-.01).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 325, 840 S.E.2d at 724.
22 Id. at 322, 840 S.E.2d at 722.
23 O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(4) (2020).
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an owner of any building, bridge, or other structure, including a person
who installs industrialized buildings as defined in paragraphs (3) and
(4) of Code Section 8-2-111, for the construction or improvement of,
addition to, or the repair, alteration, or remodeling of any such
building, bridge, or structure for use by the owner or by others or for
resale to others. The term “contractor” for purposes of this chapter
shall include a person who contracts to, undertakes to, or submits a
bid or proposal to perform, or otherwise does himself or herself
perform, for an owner:
(A) Construction management services relative to the performance by
others of such construction activities where the person performing
such construction management services is at risk contractually to the
owner for the performance and cost of the construction; and
(B) Services of a contractor as part of performance of design-build
services,
whether as a prime contractor, joint venture partner, or as a
subcontractor to a design professional acting as prime contractor as
part of a design-build entity or combination. 24

The court rejected Lucas’ argument that he was not a contractor,
noting that Lucas had agreed he entered into contracts with the
Fleetwoods to perform services for compensation, including making
repairs to the house and the office. 25 Thus, the court found that
Lucas “for compensation, contract[ed] to . . . personally or by others
perform [ ] . . . the construction or improvement of, addition to, or the
repair, alteration, or remodeling of any . . . building, . . . for use by the
owner or by others or for resale to others.” 26

Accordingly, “he was a contractor as defined in O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(4)
and was required to have a license under O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(a).” 27 The
court concluded Lucas was barred from bringing the action and reversed
with direction that the trial court enter judgment for the Fleetwoods. 28
B.

LFR Invsestments, LLC v. Van Sant

LFR Investments, LLC v. Van Sant 29 is another example of the
Georgia Court of Appeals strictly enforcing the plain meaning licensing
Fleetwood, 354 Ga. App. at 324–25, 840 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(4)).
Fleetwood, 354 Ga. App. at 325, 840 S.E.2d at 724.
26 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(4)).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 355 Ga. App. 101, 842 S.E.2d 574 (2020).
24
25

2020]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

63

statutes. 30 LFR Investments (LFR) was a single-member LLC with its
sole member being Louis Reynaud. Reynaud held a valid contractor’s
license as a residential basic qualifying agent registered with the Georgia
Department of State for the entity Peachtree Gardens Development, Inc.
However, at no time was Reynaud registered as a residential basic
qualifying agent for LFR. LFR entered into a contract with Van Sant to
purchase a property in Forsyth. Van Sant hired LFR as general
contractor to build a house on the property. However, about a year before
the house was completed Van Sant terminated the contract with LFR
and hired another contractor to complete the work. LFR filed suit against
Van Sant for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Van Sant filed a
motion for partial summary judgement arguing that LFR did not have
the right to enforce the contract because he was not properly licensed.
LFR argued that, because its sole member Reynaud was properly
licensed as a statutory “qualifying agent” for another entity, LFR should
be considered properly licensed and able to enforce the contract. 31
The court looked to the plain language of the statute, which provides:
[N]o person, whether an individual or a business organization, shall
have the right to engage in the business of residential contracting or
general contracting without a current, valid residential contractor
license or general contractor license, respectively, issued by the
division under this chapter or, in the case of a business organization,
unless such business organization shall have a qualifying agent as
provided in this chapter holding such a current, valid residential
contractor or general contractor license on behalf of such organization
issued to such qualifying agent as provided in this chapter. 32

The court rejected LFR’s argument and found that O.C.G.A.
§ 43-41-9(a) 33 required the sponsoring agent to be registered for the
entity that is using the license. 34 The court held that “for a business to be
considered properly licensed, . . . it must have at least one qualifying
agent that is properly licensed, and that qualifying agent must
specifically hold a license on that business's behalf.” 35 Given that
Reynaud had not qualified as a registered agent on behalf of LFR, LFR
was not a properly licensed entity and the contract was unenforceable by
LFR. 36 The court noted: “For Reynaud to be considered a qualifying agent
Id. at 103, 842 S.E.2d at 577.
Id. at 101–02, 842 S.E.2d at 576.
32 Id. at 103–04, 842 S.E.2d at 577 (alteration in original) (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 43-41-17(a)) (emphasis added).
33 O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(a) (2020).
34 LFR Invs., LLC, 355 Ga. App. at 104, 842 S.E.2d at 577 (citing O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(a)).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 105, 842 S.E.2d at 578.
30
31
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on LFR's behalf, the statute therefore makes clear that Reynaud must
hold a license specifically on LFR's behalf, and to obtain that license,
Reynaud must have applied for such license with the Secretary of State
‘expressly on behalf of’ LFR.” 37 The court also noted that O.C.G.A.
§ 43-41-9(e)(2) 38 “explicitly contemplates that ‘a qualifying agent may
serve in such capacity for more than one business organization[.]’” 39 To
do so, however, the statute specifies that the qualifying agent must still
“satisfy the criteria for serving in such capacity with regard to each such
business organization[.]” 40
C.

Restor-It, Inc. v. Beck

In Restor-It, Inc. v. Beck, 41 Beck engaged Restor-It, Inc. (Restor-It), an
unlicensed contractor, to perform remodeling work, including electrical
and plumbing work. Restor-It held no general or specialty contractor’s
license, but nevertheless performed a portion of the work. Beck, upon
discovering Restor-It’s lack of any license, refused to pay. Restor-It then
sued for the balance due. 42 The Georgia Court of Appeals posed the issues
as “whether the trial court properly found that Restor-It performed
electrical and plumbing work, whether Restor-It was exempt from the
requirement that it be licensed to perform such work, and whether the
contract between Restor-It and Beck [was unenforceable by Restor-It]
based on Restor-It’s performance of such work” without a license. 43
The trial court found that the contract between Restor-It and Beck
included plumbing and electrical work for which Restor-It did not have a
valid specialty contractor’s license to perform, and therefore Restor-It
could not enforce the agreement. 44 Under O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(12), 45 a
“specialty contractor” is defined as
[A] contractor whose scope of work and responsibility is of limited
scope dealing with only a specific trade and directly related and
ancillary work and whose performance is limited to such specialty
construction work requiring special skill and requiring specialized

Id. at 104, 842 S.E.2d at 577.
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(e)(2) (2020).
39 LFR Invs., LLC, 355 Ga. App. at 105, 842 S.E.2d at 578 (alterations in original)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(e)(2)).
40 Id. at 105, 842 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(e)(2)).
41 352 Ga. App. 613, 835 S.E.2d 398 (2019).
42 Id. at 613–14, 835 S.E.2d at 400–01.
43 Id. at 614, 835 S.E.2d at 401.
44 Id.
45 O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(12) (2020).
37
38
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building trades or crafts, including, but not limited to, such activities,
work, or services requiring licensure under Chapter 14 of this title. 46

Restor-It countered with a rather circular argument, to the effect that
it was a specialty contractor, and therefore was not required to have a
general contractor’s license, and that under the language of the statute
(O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(f)), 47 specialty contractors are exempt
[F]rom securing a general contractor's license to perform work
under . . . “this chapter . . . provided that such other work involved is
incidental to and an integral part of the exempt work performed by the
specialty contractor and does not exceed the greater of $10,000.00 or 25
percent of the total value at the time of contracting of the work to be
performed.” 48
The court rejected Restor-It’s argument as misstating the law, holding
that the statute creates no exception to the requirement that specialty
contractors be licensed, but merely authorizes holders of valid specialty
licenses to perform portions of larger projects without having a general
contractor’s license. 49 Further,
the statute also clearly and specifically states, “nothing in this chapter
shall permit a specialty contractor to perform work falling within the
licensing requirements of Chapter 14 of this title where such specialty
contractor is not duly licensed under such chapter to perform such
work.” Accordingly, a plain reading of the statute prohibits a specialty
contractor from performing any electrical or plumbing work without a
[specialty contractor’s] license, as mandated by O.C.G.A.
§ 43-14-8(a)(1)and (b). 50

Essentially, the court held that there is no de minimis exception under
the statute for work requiring a specialty contractor’s license. 51 “Thus, it
is of no consequence whether Restor-It is a general contractor or a
specialty contractor. The contract with Beck required substantial
electrical and plumbing work, and neither a general contractor nor a
specialty contractor can perform such work without an electrical or
plumbing license.” 52

46 Restore-It, Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 616, 835 S.E.2d at 402 (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 43-41-2(12)).
47 O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(f) (2020).
48 Restore-It, Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 614, 619, 835 S.E.2d at 401, 404 (alterations in
original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(f) (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 618–19, 835 S.E.2d at 403–04.
50 Id. at 619, 835 S.E.2d at 404 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(f)) (alterations in original).
51 Id. at 619, 835 S.E.2d at 404.
52 Id. at 618, 835 S.E.2d at 403 (citing O.C.G.A. § 43-14-8).
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The court also rejected Restor-It’s argument that a failure to obtain a
license is grounds for an injunction only and that Restor-It should still be
able to enforce the contract. 53 The court applied the plain language of the
statute and affirmed the trial court’s finding that the failure of Restor-It
to obtain the proper licenses for the electrical and plumbing work
rendered the contract unenforceable by Restor-It under O.C.G.A.
§ 43-14-8(a)(1). 54
Note: While undoubtedly reaching the correct result, the court went
beyond the literal language of the statutes in indicating the contract was
“void” as contrasted to being “unenforceable” by the unlicensed
contractor. The court quoted dicta from its decision in Brantley Land &
Timber v. W & D Investments, 55 where it was stated that
[W]here a statute provides that persons proposing to engage in a
certain business shall procure a license before being authorized to do
so, and where it appears from the terms of the statute that it was
enacted not merely as a revenue measure but was intended as a
regulation of such business in the interest of the public, contracts
made in violation of such statute are void and unenforceable. 56

In Brantley, however, the contract in question was found to be
enforceable, and therefore certainly not void, rendering the reference to
the contract being void dicta. 57
While the Georgia appellate courts have not reached the issue of
quantifying the affirmative remedies of the other contracting party
against the unlicensed contractor failing to have an appropriate
contractor’s license, the issue has been addressed in other states, with
most courts concluding that assuming the other contracting party was
not in pari delicto with the unlicensed contractor, their remedies remain
intact. For example, in Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 58 the California
Supreme Court held, in construing a statute similar to Georgia’s
licensing statute, that where a contractor was barred from recovery due
to failure to have a proper contractor’s license, the owner could
nevertheless recover damages. 59
It is true that when the Legislature enacts a statute forbidding certain
conduct for the purpose of protecting one class of persons from the
Id. at 622, 835 S.E.2d at 406.
Id. at 613, 835 S.E.2d at 400; O.C.G.A. § 43-14-8.
55 316 Ga. App. 277, 729 S.E.2d 458 (2012).
56 Restore-It, Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 617, 835 S.E.2d at 403 (quoting Brantley Land &
Timber, 316 Ga. App. at 278, 729 S.E.2d at 459).
57 Brantley, 316 Ga. App. at 280, 729 S.E.2d at 461.
58 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
59 Id. at 150,154, 308 P.2d at 719,721.
53
54
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activities of another, a member of the protected class may maintain an
action notwithstanding the fact that he has shared in the illegal
transaction. The protective purpose of the legislation is realized by
allowing the plaintiff to maintain his action against a defendant
within the class primarily to be deterred. In this situation it is said
that the plaintiff is not in pari delicto. 60

Among the unanswered questions in Georgia, however, is the fact that
whether a contractor holds a Georgia contractor’s license is a matter of
public record through the Secretary of State’s website, 61 thereby putting
such information within the public domain. That creates the opportunity
for owners to engage a contractor knowing they are unlicensed and then
“lying in the weeds” and refusing to pay. In such circumstances, would
the other contracting party be found to be in pari delicto with the
unlicensed contractor? Time will tell.
III. STATUTE OF REPOSE
A.

Southern States Chemical, Inc. v. Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc.

Georgia’s Statute of Repose 62 bars any action against a contractor
improving realty after eight years following substantial completion of the
work. 63 It states:
(a) No action to recover damages:
(1) For any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning, design,
specifications, supervision or observation of construction, or
construction of an improvement to real property;
(2) For injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such
deficiency; or
(3) For injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any
such deficiency shall be brought against any person performing or
furnishing the survey or plat, design, planning, supervision or
observation of construction, or construction of such an improvement
more than eight years after substantial completion of such an
improvement. 64

Id. at 153, 308 P.2d at 720 (citations omitted).
Georgia Secretary of State, https://sos.ga.gov (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
62 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 (2020).
63 Id.
64 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(a)(1)–(3) (emphasis added).
60
61
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O.C.G.A. § 9-3-50 65 defines substantial completion as “the date when
construction was sufficiently completed, in accordance with the contract
as modified by any change order agreed to by the parties, so that the
owner could occupy the project for the use for which it was intended.” 66
In 2000, Southern States Chemical, Inc. (Southern) contracted with
Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc. (Tampa) to convert an industrial chemical
containment tank designed to hold molten sulfur to hold two million
gallons of liquid sulfuric acid. The renovation required that a new steel
floor be welded over the existing steel floor with a layer of sand
containing a cathodic corrosion control system to be sandwiched between
the two floors to prevent corrosion. This system was installed by Tampa
but was designed by Corrosion Control, Inc. (CCI), installed under the
supervision of CCI, and tested by CCI. 67
The tank conversion was substantially completed in January 2002. At
the time of project completion, Tampa commissioned CCI to prepare a
post-installation commissioning inspection report on the completed tank,
in which it estimated the tank should have a useful life of between
forty-three and forty-five years. On July 3, 2011 (nine and one-half years
later), Southern discovered that sulfuric acid was leaking from the tank.
Southern then initiated an action against Tampa to recover damages in
contract and tort, claiming that Tampa breached its warranty by failing
to install the system properly, negligently driving Bobcats over the sand
after the cathodic corrosion control system had been installed, and failing
to properly seal the floor leading to rainwater penetrating and corroding
the system. Tampa vouched CCI into this action claiming that CCI failed
to properly test and design the system. 68
Tampa had included a twelve-month materials and workmanship
warranty for the renovation of the tank but CCI provided no express
warranty. 69
Southern argue[d] that the statute of repose, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(a),
[was] not applicable because the claims against Appellees were not for
a construction deficiency but for breach of express written warranties.
Southern further contend[ed] the trial court erred by concluding that
the statute of limitation on simple written contracts [(six years)]
bar[red] its claim against Appellees, by ruling that Southern failed as
a matter of law to exercise due diligence to discover Appellees' alleged

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-50 (2020).
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-50(2).
67 Southern States Chemical, Inc. v. Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc., 353 Ga. App. 286,
287, 836 S.E.2d 617, 619–20 (2019).
68 Id. at 286–88, 836 S.E.2d at 619–20.
69 Id. at 290, 836 S.E.2d at 622.
65
66
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fraud [(concealment of the defect)], and by dismissing Southern’s
breach of contract per se claim. 70

In this case’s third appearance before the Georgia Court of Appeals,
the court examined whether Southern should be considered a third-party
beneficiary of the contract between Tampa and CCI, and whether the CCI
Report constituted an express warranty for forty-three to forty-five
years. 71 The court held that because Tampa, and not CCI, installed the
system, Southern did not get a direct contractual benefit from CCI which
only designed and tested the product. 72 Accordingly, Southern could not
be considered a third-party beneficiary of any “warranty.” 73 The court
then looked to whether the statute of repose barred suit. 74 Southern
argued that the statute of repose did not bar suit because the tank
conversion was not an improvement to realty and that the suit was for a
breach of express warranty, rather than for deficient construction. 75 The
court rejected this argument and looked to Mullis v. Southern Co.
Services 76 to find the test of whether construction services constitute
improvements to real property, triggering the statute of repose. 77
These factors are (1) is the improvement permanent in nature; (2) does
it add to the value of the realty, for the purposes for which it was
intended to be used; (3) was it intended by the contracting parties that
the “improvement” in question be an improvement to real property or
did they intend for it to remain personalty. 78

The court held that all the indicia of an intent that the storage tank
renovations be improvements to realty were present, and found that the
statute of repose did apply, barring Southern’s claims. 79
Finally, the court examined whether Southern could raise fraud as an
estoppel to prevent application of the statute of repose. 80 Southern
argued that the trial court erred in finding that Southern failed to
exercise due diligence in not discovering the leak (having failed to
perform recommended independent inspections). 81 However, the court
Id. at 286, 836 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 290–91, 836 S.E.2d at 622.
72 Id. at 291–92, 836 S.E.2d at 622–23.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 292, 836 S.E.2d at 623.
75 Id.
76 250 Ga. 90, 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982).
77 S. States Chem., Inc., 353 Ga. App. at 293, 836 S.E.2d at 624.
78 Id. (quoting Mullis, 250 Ga. at 94, 296 S.E.2d at 583).
79 Id. at 294, 836 S.E.2d at 624.
80 Id. at 295, 836 S.E.2d at 625.
81 Id.
70
71
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held that no evidence of fraud had been presented that would have
prevented Southern from discovering the defect in the construction. 82
The court's
review of the unambiguous language of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(a) [found]
that the statute makes no distinction between claims sounding in
negligence and those sounding in contract. Whether in tort or in
contract, the statute broadly precludes any action to recover damages
brought outside the eight-year period of repose. It is well settled that
“a statute of ultimate repose frames the time period in which a right
may accrue, if at all. Therefore, if an injury occurs outside this time
period, the injury is not actionable.” 83

IV.

MILLER ACT CLAIMS – RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

A.United States ex rel. Cleveland Construction, Inc. v. Stellar Group.,
Inc.
In United States ex rel. Cleveland Construction, Inc. v. Stellar Group.,
Inc., 84 a Miller Act and breach of contract suit, Stellar Group, Inc.
(Stellar) was contracted by the Department of Defense (DOD) to do work
at Fort Benning. Stellar subcontracted to Cleveland Construction, Inc.
(Cleveland) to do work on the job. After the completion of the project,
Cleveland brought an action for breach of contract against Stellar and its
surety, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, claiming that Stellar failed
to pay the full amount due under the contract, plus additional labor and
materials, and other additional costs associated with the project owed to
Cleveland. Stellar counterclaimed for change order costs, supervision
costs, delay, and other conditions and damages. 85
The parties stipulated that they would present their claims for
damages against each other through expert testimony. Through its
expert, Cleveland brought the following claims against Stellar: (1)
additional direct labor and material claim for $2,964,800; (2) extended
general conditions claim for $395,381; (3) pending cost proposals
$78,848; and (4) outstanding Subcontract balance claim for $917,512.
Therefore, Cleveland sought total damages against Stellar of
$4,356,541. Stellar brought the following counterclaims against
Cleveland: (1) change order costs for $947,498.88; (2) added
supervision costs for $1,610,106.95; (3) extended general conditions for
$1,353,119.04; and (4) liquidated damages for $542,803.52.Stellar thus
Id.
Id. (quoting Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 289 Ga. 57, 59, 709 S.E.2d 227, 229
(2011)); O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(a).
84 No. 4:16-CV-179 (CDL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12709, at *1 (Jan. 28, 2019).
85 Id. at *1–2.
82
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sought total damages from Cleveland of $4,453,528.39, less the
retained Subcontract balance of $917,511.71. . . . The jury awarded
$2,481,060 to Cleveland, but concluded Liberty was not jointly liable
for any of this amount. The jury also awarded $1,300,000 to Stellar.
Based on the parties' setoff stipulation, the clerk entered judgment in
favor of Cleveland in the amount of $1,181,060. The parties stipulated
that any issues presented by motions for attorneys' fees would be
decided by the Court. 86

In determining entitlement to an award for attorney’s fees, the court
was required to construe the applicable contract provision, which
provided for an award of attorney’s fees, only in favor of Stellar. 87 The
attorney’s fee provision of the contract stated: “Upon any default,
[Cleveland] shall pay to [Stellar] its attorney[’s] fees and court costs
incurred in enforcing this Subcontract or seeking any remedies
hereunder.” 88 The issue presented was whether Stellar could recover all
of its attorney’s fees, despite having prevailed on only some of its
claims. 89 The court ruled Stellar could recover attorney’s fees that Stellar
could demonstrate arose from its “successful enforcement of the
Subcontract and/or successful pursuit of remedies for a default.” 90 The
court allowed Stellar to amend its motion to better track those fees. 91
Cleveland also moved for an award of attorney’s fees under the court’s
“inherent power” to award attorney's fees based upon Stellar’s bad
faith. 92 Although affirming its power to do so, the court declined to award
such fees because there had not been a sufficient showing of Stellar’s bad
faith. 93
B. United States ex rel. Dixie Communications Systems v. Travelers
Casualty & Surety Co. of America
In United States ex rel. Dixie Communications Systems v. Travelers
Casualty & Surety Co. of America, 94 Dixie Communications Systems,
Inc., (Dixie) was a second-tier subcontractor on a federal project involving
the construction and renovation of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Army
Medical Center's Fisher Army Dental Laboratory (the Project). J&J
Maintenance, Inc. (J&J) was the general contractor for the Project. J&J
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *4.
88 Id. (alterations in original).
89 Id.
90 Id. at *7.
91 Id. at *7–8.
92 Id. at *8.
93 Id. at *9.
94 No. CV 118-210, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162223 ( Sep. 23, 2019).
86
87
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subcontracted with the first-tier subcontractor, ICON, to perform work
on the Project. ICON then subcontracted with plaintiff to install alarm
systems. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America's
(Travelers) supplied the Miller Act Project bond for the Project to J&J.
After J&J, ICON, and Travelers each refused payment to Dixie, Dixie
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
asserting four claims against J&J, Icon, and Travelers: (1) breach of
contract; (2) quantum meruit; (3) a Miller Act bond claim; and (4) bad
faith refusal to settle. Dixie failed to give notice of its bond claim to J&J
within ninety days of completing its work and failed to allege giving
notice to the general contractor in its Complaint. ICON filed bankruptcy
and did not participate in the suit. 95
J&J and Travelers moved to dismiss all counts of the complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 96 due to Dixie’s
failure to give timely notice to J&J of its claims. 97 Dixie replied not with
an amended complaint but rather filed a response to which it attached
documentation seeking to convert the defendants’ motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment. 98 The court addressed in detail the rules
for allowing consideration of extrinsic documentation in response to a
motion to dismiss. 99 Although the court allowed some of the
documentation to be considered in connection with the motions to dismiss
because it supported the basic allegations of the complaint, the court held
that the extrinsic evidence did not support converting the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 100 “The Court is limited at
the motion to dismiss stage to the facts as pleaded in the [c]omplaint and
attaching an affidavit to a response to a motion to dismiss is not a
procedure for modifying the [c]omplaint.” 101 Because no genuine issue of
fact was properly raised concerning notice to the general contractor, the
court granted J&J and Traveler’s motion to dismiss Dixie’s Miller Act
Claim. 102
A person having a direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor
but no contractual relationship, express or implied, with the contractor
furnishing the payment bond may bring a civil action on the payment
bond on giving written notice to the contractor within [ninety] days
from the date on which the person did or performed the last of the labor
Id. at *1–3.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (2020).
97 Dixie Communication Systems, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162223, at *3.
98 Id. at *3–4.
99 Id. at *4.
100 Id. at *10.
101 Id. at *9.
102 Id. at *19–20.
95
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or furnished or supplied the last of the material for which the claim is
made. 103

The court dismissed Dixie’s claim of breach of contract citing the lack
of any contract between Dixie and the general contractor, J&J, but
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Dixie’s quantum meruit
claim. 104 The court acknowledged that “[u]nder Georgia law, a . . .
subcontractor may not recover against a . . . general contractor with
whom it has no contractual relationship, based on the theory of unjust
enrichment or implied contract; rather, it is limited to the statutory
remedies provided by Georgia’s lien statute . . . .” 105 However, the court
acknowledged that “a lien cannot attach to [federal] Government
property[,]” and absent the availability of an equitable remedy, Dixie
would be left without any remedy. 106 Accordingly, while a “right to pursue
a lien on [a] project precludes a quantum meruit claim, [because] state
liens are unavailable as a matter of law on a federal public works project,
the lien statute no longer stands in the way of a quantum meruit claim
against the primary contractor.” 107 Accordingly, the court allowed the
quantum meruit claim to stand. 108 Finally, the court also dismissed the
bad faith refusal to settle count against Traveler’s because the dismissal
of the Miller Act Claim eliminated any liability of Traveler’s to Dixie. 109
V.
A.

NEGLIGENT CONSTRUCTION/INDEMNITY

Milliken & Co. v. Georgia Power Co.

In Milliken & Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 110 on February 20, 2013, a
small jet crashed into a Georgia Power transmission pole that was
located on the property of Milliken & Company near the
Thomson-McDuffie Regional Airport in Thomson, Georgia. The airplane
was attempting a “go-around,” after an aborted landing attempt. When
the airplane was about sixty-three feet above ground level, the left wing
struck the utility pole, which was seventy-two feet high and about 1,835
feet from the runway threshold, severing the outboard portion of the
wing. The airplane continued another 925 feet before crashing in a
Id. at *7 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(2)).
Id. at *15, *17.
105 Id. at *15 (alterations in original) (quoting Hussey v. Georgia Ports Authority, 240
Ga. App. 504, 506, 420 S.E.2d 50, 53 (1992).
106 Id. at *16–17 (alteration in original) (quoting J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434
U.S. 586, 589 (1978)).
107 Id. at *17.
108 Id.
109 Id. at *20.
110 306 Ga. 6, 829 S.E.2d 111 (2019).
103
104
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wooded area. The two pilots were injured, and the five passengers died.
The families of the passengers filed suit against Georgia Power and
Milliken alleging that a transmission pole located on Milliken’s property
was negligently erected and maintained within the airport’s protected
airspace. Georgia Power constructed the transmission pole on Milliken’s
property for the purpose of providing electricity to Milliken’s
manufacturing plant expansion, located adjacent to the airport, and the
pole was constructed pursuant to a 1989 easement between Georgia
Power and Milliken. The complaint included claims for negligent
construction and maintenance, both torts. 111
Milliken filed cross-claims against Georgia Power claiming that under
the grant of easement, Georgia Power was contractually obligated to
indemnify Milliken
“[F]or all sums that [p]laintiffs may recover from Milliken” under
Paragraph 12 of the 1989 Easement, which provides: [Georgia Power]
Company, its successors[,] or assigns shall hold [Milliken], its
successors[,] or assigns harmless from any damages to property or
persons (including death), or both, which result from [Georgia Power]
Company's construction, operation or maintenance of its facilities on
said easement areas herein granted. 112

Georgia Power moved for summary judgment, contending the
conveyance of the easement granted a covenant not to sue rather than an
indemnity agreement. The trial court agreed because the clause failed to
include the term “indemnify.” 113
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the provision did
amount to an indemnity obligation, but the indemnity agreement was
void as against public policy under former O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) 114 because
the provision made Georgia Power liable to indemnify Milliken for
damages caused by Milliken’s sole negligence. 115 Former O.C.G.A.
§ 13-8-2(b) provided:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection
with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the
construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building
structure, appurtenances, and appliances, including moving,
demolition, and excavating connected therewith, purporting to
indemnify or hold harmless the promisee against liability for damages
arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by
Id. at 6–7, 829 S.E.2d at 112.
Id. at 7, 829 S.E.2d at 112 (alterations in original).
113 Id.
114 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (2006).
115 Milliken & Co., 306 Ga. at 7, 829 S.E.2d at 113.
111
112

2020]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

75

or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or
employees, or indemnitee is against public policy and is void and
unenforceable . . . . 116

However, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed this holding, ruling
that the indemnity provision was not void under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b)
because although it did, “(1) relate[] in some way to a contract for
‘construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance’ of certain property[,]” 117
it did not require indemnity against “liability for damages arising out of
bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting
from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or
indemnitee” 118 because the clause requires that Georgia Power Company
indemnify “Milliken for damages resulting from Georgia Power’s acts or
omissions, whereas the statute would prohibit an agreement that
provides indemnity for damages resulting from Milliken’s sole
negligence[,]” 119 and therefore the provision did not violate the statute
and was not void as against public policy. 120
Note that O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) was amended in 2018 and now
provides:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection
with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the
construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building
structure, appurtenances, and appliances, including moving,
demolition, and excavating connected therewith, purporting to require
that one party to such contract or agreement shall indemnify, hold
harmless, insure, or defend the other party to the contract or other
named indemnitee, including its, his, or her officers, agents, or
employees, against liability or claims for damages, losses, or expenses,
including attorney fees, arising out of bodily injury to persons, death,
or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence
of the indemnitee, or its, his, or her officers, agents, or employees, is
against public policy and void and unenforceable. 121

116 Id. at 8–9, 829 S.E.2d at 113 (emphasis in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b)
(2006)).
117 Id. at 9, 829 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting Kennedy Dev. Co. v. Camp, 290 Ga. 257, 259, 719
S.E.2d 442, 444 (2011)).
118 Id. 306 Ga. at 10, 829 S.E.2d at 114 (emphasis in original) (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 13-8-2(b) (2006)).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 12, 829 S.E.2d at 116.
121 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (2020) (emphasis added).
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LIENS AND LIEN WAIVERS

Duke Builders, Inc. v. Massey

In Duke Builders, Inc. v. Massey, 122 Duke Builders, Inc. (Duke
Builders) was contracted by the Masseys to work with the Masseys’
insurance company and rebuild a house after a fire substantially
destroyed the dwelling. Duke began construction but did not complete
the job. When the Masseys refused to pay, Duke filed a materialman’s
lien against the property for the cost of the work completed plus lost
profits for the work that was not completed. 123 The trial court found that
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(a)–(b) 124 allows a lien for only the amount of
completed work, and since the filed lien was in excess of that amount, the
lien was void in its entirety. 125
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that even
though § 44-14-361(a)–(b) limited the amount of the lien to the value of
the work completed, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a) 126 does not require that
the lien be filed in an exact amount. 127 Therefore, the court was allowed
to “blue pencil” the lien to reflect the value of only the completed work. 128
On March 26, 2020, the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and
indicated it would hear the case during its June 2020 arguments. 129
B.

ALA Construction Services, LLC v. Controlled Access, Inc.

Georgia Code Title 44 Property § 44-14-366 130 regulates lien waivers
in connection with construction projects within the state. It prescribes
forms that must be substantially complied with and, once filed, are
binding whether payment has been received or not unless a certificate of
non-payment is filed within sixty days (old version). 131
In ALA Construction Services, LLC v. Controlled Access, Inc., 132 ALA
Construction Services, LLC (ALA) hired Controlled Access, Inc. (CA) to
do work at Sugar Hill Overlook Townhomes. CA signed an interim waiver
and release upon payment form in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-366,
which released any and all liens that CA would have against the subject
351 Ga. App. 535, 831 S.E.2d 172 (2019).
Id. at 535–36, 831 S.E.2d at 174.
124 O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361 (2020).
125 Duke Builders, Inc., 351 Ga. App. at 536, 831 S.E.2d at 174.
126 O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a) (2020).
127 Duke Builders, Inc., 351 Ga. App. at 539, 831 S.E.2d at 176.
128 Id. at 538–39, 831 S.E.2d at 176.
129 Massey v. Duke Brothers, Inc., No. S20C0018, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 269 (Mar. 26, 2020).
130 O.C.G.A. § 44-14-366 (2020).
131 O.C.G.A. § 44-14-366(f)(1)(C).
132 351 Ga. App. 841, 833 S.E.2d 570 (2019).
122
123
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property. However, ALA failed to pay CA the remaining balance for the
work performed. CA failed to file an affidavit of non-payment or a claim
of lien within the prescribed period of sixty days from the execution of
the waiver. 133 The court held that the plain language of O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-366 stated that if an affidavit of non-payment or a claim of lien
are not filed within sixty days, the contract should be treated as paid in
full. 134 The court held that this meant that all remedies of CA for recovery
of the balance due, including breach of contract, were extinguished since
the contract was treated as if it was paid in full. 135
This decision would be reversed by SB 315, 136 2020, which has passed
both the House and the Senate and is awaiting the Governor’s signature.
This new bill amends the wording in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-366 to
extinguish only lien rights and not other remedies that may be available
to the contractors such as damages for breach of contract. 137 It also
amends the time frame from sixty days to ninety days and requires that
an affidavit of non-payment be filed within ninety days rather than either
an affidavit of non-payment or a claim of lien. 138
VIII.
A.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

Georgia Interfaith Power & Light, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co.

On March 29, 2017, Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, Georgia
Power’s lead contractor on Units 3 and 4 for the Vogtle Nuclear Plant,
filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and subsequently rejected its contract with
Georgia Power. Following the contractor’s bankruptcy, Georgia Power
submitted its 17th semi-annual construction monitoring report to the
Public Service Commission (PSC). In the report Georgia Power requested
approval of additional costs for replacing the contractor and assumed the
burden to prove that any amount over $5.68 billion was prudent. The
PSC signed off on the expenditures for the 17th semi-annual construction
monitoring report. Georgia Watch filed a petition for consumers to
recover some of the costs of the construction (through reduced rates for
electricity) and appealed the PSC’s decision to approve the 17th
semi-annual construction monitoring report. Georgia Power intervened
on the case and moved for dismissal contending that the PSC’s approval
of the report was final. 139 The court held that all the administrative
ALA Construction Services, LLC, 351 Ga. App. at 841, 833 S.E.2d 570 at 570–71.
Id. at 844, 833 S.E.2d at 572.
135 Id.
136 S.B. 315, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2020).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 352 Ga. App. 670, 670–72, 835 S.E.2d 656, 658–59 (2019).
133
134
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options must first be exhausted before appealing the decision of an
administrative body. 140 In this case the petitioners did not appeal
through the administrative process. 141 However, the Georgia Court of
Appeals remanded the case to determine if the administrative process
would have provided a remedy or if the administrative process would
have been ineffective and judicial review would be required. 142

Id. at 672–73, 835 S.E.2d at 659.
Id. at 672, 835 S.E.2d at 659.
142 Id. at 675, 835 S.E.2d at 660–61.
140
141

